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AFONG MOY, the first Chinese woman to “immigrate”
to the United States, was imported for exhibition
in 1834 by brothers Nathaniel and Frederick Carne.
A poster dating from 1842 proclaims, in typography
by turns gaudy and sensibly serif,
“THE CHINESE LADY, AFONG MOY, Lately
exhibited in Mobile, Providence, Boston, Salem,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Richmond,
Norfolk, Charleston, New York and New Haven,
will have the honor of appearing before the
Company in a splendid CHINESE SALOON, fitted up with rich Canton Satin Damask Chinese
Paintings, Lanterns and Curiosities.”
An illustration depicts her smothered in an elaborate silken robe, and smothered once more in the
dizzyingly intricate saloon. She appears to be one
with the chinoiserie and the Canton Satin Damask
Chinese Paintings behind her. Of her own flesh we
see only her face, her hands, and her “astonishingly
litte feet.”1
The last of Moy’s traces dates from 1850; what happened to her afterwards, if anything, is unknown.
But her life’s echo is heard in all the decorative
Asian beauties, more ornament than person, who
have been paraded about to the American public
since. Denied humanity through aestheticization,
the yellow woman is nevertheless no object of art—
china is, after all, irremediably associated with
kitsch. She lives, instead, as ornament.
There is a ready vocabulary to describe the forces
at work here: objectification, on the one hand (the
OED’s chipper, concise definition: “the action of
degrading someone to the status of a mere object”
2
); Orientalism, on the other (“the representation
of Asia … in a stereotyped way … [that embodies]
a colonialist attitude”3). It is well-established in
feminist thought that women have been considered

less than human, well-established in black feminist
thought that the manner of this dehumanization is
splintered along racial lines (think, by comparison,
of the Hottentot Venus and her fetishized flesh).
But stating this truth does not tell us its meaning or
its consequences. It is one thing to identify oppressive fictions, but quite another to understand, let
alone explain, the hybrid, fantastical beings—Asiatic
cyborgs, porcelain dolls, geisha girls—that emerge
from these strange and violent conflations.
What Anne Cheng looks to offer in her new monograph Ornamentalism is a heretofore-missing theory
of Asiatic femininity. She doesn’t look to critique
the confluence of racism and sexism that produces
the not-quite-human, not-quite-thing that is the “yellow woman” (a term she revives to grapple with its
legacy) so much as to examine what kind of being
gets produced.
Where black feminist thinkers like Hortense Spillers
have focused on flesh as the site of the black woman’s denigration and racialization, Cheng’s theory
of the yellow woman revolves around flesh’s opposite: artifice, ornament, style. “The yellow woman …
makes visible [an] unspeakable aspect of injury: its
unnerving capacity to be seen as a quality of beauty
and to incite appreciation. There are few figures who
exemplify the beauty of abjectness more than the
yellow woman,” she writes. Cheng argues that style
has not been supplemental to the being of the yellow
woman, but constitutive of it. And she suggests that
this speaks to a broader truth: that style and artifice
are always constitutive of being, and that in looking
for a unified essence, an organic body, or a natural
personhood, we look for the impossible.
Ornamentalism poses a challenge to the kind
of personhood that canonical political philosophers—Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and William
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Blackstone—conceived of: a personhood characterized by freedom, autonomy, agency, and natural
internal coherence. She shares this anti-humanist
critique with Marxist, feminist, and critical race
theorists, who have been arguing since the 20th
century that humans are much less free than powerful people—who have tended to be propertied
white men—have claimed they are. Her innovation
is that she does not seek redemption through a
return to agency, bodies, or personhood. Instead
she embraces surface, excess, and non-humanity,
insisting, in fact, on their centrality, and enjoining
her fellow feminist and race scholars to overcome
nostalgia for the flesh.

6

“If we dismiss this association between Asiatic
femininity and Chinese ceramic as yet another
Orientalist cliché, we miss a much more intricate
and intriguing proposition: the affinity between
racialization, imagined personhood, and synthetic invention.”

Perhaps there is no contradiction here. Perhaps
delineating something that others would will away is
complementary, not dialectical, to their efforts. After
all, Ornamentalism offers itself as a solution to the
political anemia of other schools of object-oriented
ontology, known broadly and popularly as post-humanism. Post-humanism is a broad term indeed,
encapsulating a range of critical impulses that are
Each of Cheng’s chapters takes up a new cluster of
loosely united in their decentering of humanity.
case studies, and a new intersection of disciplines,
Sometimes these impulses are technological (the
in order to probe at the interface of personhood
robots-are-coming-to-get-us school), sometimes enviand objecthood. The book’s first half is devoted to
ronmental (the climate-change-is-coming-to-get-us
humans who are produced through style. The first
school); either way, they frame post-humanism as a
chapter deconstructs legal personhood through the
distinct moment in history when the human race’s
“Case of the Twenty-Two Lewd Chinese Women,” in
dominance is on the brink of expiration. Which is
which twenty-two recently-arrived immigrants were
political enough, but this trendy new post-humanconceptualized and judged through their clothing—
ism—often practiced by white scholars—conveniently
or, more precisely, through white American men’s
forgets the roots of post-humanism in feminist and
prurient imaginings about their clothing. The second critical race theory, which has long since worked to
chapter takes up, somewhat more disjointedly, Anne question liberal humanist ideology by bringing to
May Wong’s role in Piccadilly (1929) as Shosho, an
light histories of dehumanization. Ornamentalism
objectified woman who claims her own objecthood
unites the turn towards non-human things with the
in order to achieve aesthetic centrality.
older tradition of post-humanism by pointing to ways
in which humans are constructed through things,
Ornamentalism’s second half shifts into more exper- and things comes to life—or don’t—through “the
imental territory, to thrilling results when Cheng is
conduit of racial meaning.” It therefore historicizes
most successful, and puzzling tracts when she falls
future-oriented, ahistorical post-humanism, and recshort. Where the first half investigates humans pro- onciles it with its raced and gendered past.
duced through style, the second concerns objects
that straddle and cross the border between objects
But one problem with post-humanism’s politics perand humans by invoking racial otherness. The third
sists: its treatment of agency. A rejection of liberal
chapter is a stunning study of Through the Looking
humanism is a rejection, in part, of the traditional
Glass, the Met’s exhibit of “Eastern” aesthetics and
conception of agency. But to abandon traditional
Western appropriations; the fourth is a foray into
agency without offering an alternative is to abandon
food and the border between consumer and conpolitical action. Take Marxist anti-humanism, which,
sumed; and the fifth, a rich consideration of blockat its extreme, totally denied the existence of human
buster representations of white-coded, feminine
agency, displacing the motion of history onto strucrobots who arrogate themselves to, and are haunted tural forces. The malaise of determinism makes
by, Asiatic femininity.
political action look naïve.
Cheng describes her own method best in her
description of Anna May Wong’s performance: “she
commands all things around her, centrifugally pulls
objects, lights, and glances to her magnetic center”
(81). At her critical disposal is an improbably vast
array of disciplines: celebrity studies, aesthetic
philosophy, critical legal theory, photography theory,
science and technology studies—just to name a few,
beyond the dominant frameworks of feminist and
critical race theory. Her arguments are so wide-ranging in their intellectual ancestry as to be irreducible
to their parts.

Racial post-humanism suggests that agency is not
desirable, because it occurs only in a world whose
existence we do not want to prolong, a world that
has worked to eliminate other worlds and subjugate
the life found therein: native communities, raced
populations, non-human species. It looks, instead, at
life that has appeared non-agential—in the form of
flesh, spirit, animal, plant, or cyborg—and suggests
that we cultivate that life, care for it, permit its
endurance, if not its flourishing. This is a beautiful thought, a world-loving thought. But what is the
actual practice of post-humanism?

And it is important that Cheng’s method is interdisciplinary, because one of the book’s premises is that
part of what it means to be a yellow woman is that
one is an aesthetic artifact—which is to say that, for
Cheng, the study of being and the study of aesthetics are much the same. Ornamentalism, like the
people and objects that populate it, is a profoundly
synthetic work that finds being through assemblage.
It is an act of interdisciplinary daring that is often
dazzling, bearing the occasional cost of being farfetched. And it is a redemptive reading of raced and
gendered objecthood, at the occasional risk of running counter to the political goal of censuring objectification. Cheng is keen to investigate moments of
yellowface and appropriation, and her theorizing is
so rich and achieved as to be worth the risks attendant to readings that are not specifically condemnatory. At the same time, the specter she wards off in
such moments—the specter of politics—haunts the
book. We therefore hear an almost anxious refrain,
in which Cheng defends her choice of redemption
over skepticism:

Cheng’s image of ornamentalism as practice arrives
in the monograph’s epilogue, in which she discusses
the character of Sethe in Toni Morrison’s Beloved.
Sethe’s lacerated back is on the one hand “dead,” on
the other a “chokecherry.” In her, Cheng finds “an
alternative form of ontology, one entwined with dirt,
soil, and death.” She ends on a singingly eloquent
note of redemption as found through ornament:
“The flesh that passes through objecthood needs
‘ornament’ as a way back to itself. Even Baby
Suggs’s much-quoted sermon, which so passionately urges a return to the flesh, understands that
self-possession has to be courted … This is why
her song is also a blazon of body parts: ‘backs
that need support; shoulders that need arms …
love your neck; put a hand on it, grace it, stroke it,
and hold it up” … Here the instructions for loving
the ‘natural’ body articulate this poignant and
melancholic gesture of almost orthopedic reconstruction, of carefully tacking a scaffold of the
body as a prop for one’s psyche.”

Cheng’s opening critique of feminist theory—that
it occupies itself too much with the flesh—comes
full circle here: flesh is ornament, and requires the
ornamental practices of synthesis and assemblage
in order to put itself back together again. To put this
in more familiar terms: one returns to the body with
(self-)care. At its best, Ornamentalism offers an alternative vision of agency as not resistance but resilience, of forms of living produced under impossible
conditions—providing, too, a much-needed concretization of post-humanism’s rhetorical gestures.

a manual that teaches Asian and Asian American
women how to act. But by tracing the complex
dynamics between subjecthood and objecthood, we
might begin to shake loose some of our most fundamental assumptions about what kind of person, what
kind of injury, or indeed, what kind of life can count.”
Her work, which teaches us how to think about shadowy, complex, uncomfortable figures, is complementary to activism, not activism itself.

But the theory of Asiatic femininity she has forwarded so boldly is incomplete without an audience
But if flesh may find itself through ornamental
that isn’t just scholarly, without an address to a pubpractices, how might ornament find itself? Cheng
lic community. Such is the flaw of post-humanism in
dismisses, after all, nostalgia for the flesh, so
practice: as crucial as it is and has been to trouble
there is nothing for the yellow woman to return to,
traditional notions of the human, post-humanist
no enfleshment to crave. Of course, her work has
work can fail to make a distinction between “human”
partly been to deconstruct the distinction between
as academic byword for Lockeian-liberal-humanism
flesh and ornament, but the fluidity between the
and “human” as a common word for real people. To
two seems to be one-way. Here Cheng’s effercall anti- or post-humanism literally anti-human
vescent work registers the limitations of its own
is, in an important sense, to talk past its historiframework: the figure around whom ornamentalist
cal formation; it is, in another sense, to pinpoint a
ontology is built does not stand to recover through it. deadly flaw in its evolution, during which the original
Furthermore, because the book is in no sense about referent of “human” has been partially obscured in
real Asian women, it does not speak to our lives,
a scholarly haze. Post-humanist works point to the
spectral or otherwise, an effect exacerbated by the
necessity of deep care for all forms of life, interconbook’s near-exclusive concern with ravaged beauty
nected as they are, and for marginalized forms more
and East Asian aesthetics—itself powerful and hege- than others. If they lose sight of the marginalized
monic in the age of East Asian economic and geopo- communities to which they are theoretically and ethlitical dominance. It may be telling that the subject
ically indebted, then the point is lost.
of the book’s most redemptive treatment of a yellow
woman, Shosho, is an exceedingly beautiful celebrity. Cheng has historicized and politicized post-humanism, but to be practicable, post-humanism must
What may we who carry flesh do with this work? For make good on its promises to the humans in our
us, “corporeal dematerialization” cannot be literal,
midst.
so for what is it a metaphor? And: if Asiatic femininity is style, when do Asian women—and which Asian
women—get to wear it?
It was not Cheng’s intent to address these questions: as she explicates in the preface, “This … is not

1 “FOR ONE WEEK ONLY, (Owing to other engagements.)
Unprecedented Attraction...,” 1842, American Broadsides
and Ephemera, series 1, no. 6010. 10F45405EC316290.
2 “objectification, n.2”. OED Online. March 2019.
Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/129623?redirectedFrom=objectification#eid. Accessed
Feb 18, 2019.
3 “orientalism, n.3”. OED Online. March 2019.
Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/132531?redirectedFrom=orientalism#eid. Accessed
Feb 18, 2019.
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CLIMATE LEVIATHAN:
A POLITICAL THEORY
OF OUR PLANETARY
FUTURE
GEOFF MARTIN
AND JOEL WAINWRIGHT
VERSO
207 PAGES I $18.32

a firm political will,” as if by repeating the words
over and over he could somehow coax such a will
The 24th annual United Nations Climate Conference, into existence.
or COP24, concluded on December 15th with a tepid
agreement that will do little to address our global
Why this fixation on political will? In part because
climate crisis – or perhaps nothing at all, if nations
all of the other necessary conditions for climate
continue to ignore the emissions reductions pledges action are, at this point, present and accounted for.
that they made three years ago in Paris. I attended
Gina McCarthy, the former head of the now-gutted
the first week of the COP, which was held in Katowice, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), recently
the polluted heart of Poland’s coal country. (There
remarked, “We have the scientific knowledge, we
was much fighting over what the location symbolhave the financial capacity, and we have the techniized.)1 What struck me was not that the conference
cal capacity to be able to address this. What we’re
ended with a middling accord desperately hashed
essentially lacking is political will.”
out over a sleepless final weekend – we have come
to expect little more from these international gathMcCarthy is right. Scientific knowledge: COP24
erings – but that all the delegates and diplomats
came on the heels of the latest (and grimmest)
in attendance seemed to know exactly what would
report from the IPCC, the international authority
stymie the negotiations before they even started.
on climate science, which documented the catThere was, they all insisted, one stubborn missing
astrophic effects of even 1.5 degrees Celsius of
ingredient: “political will.”
warming above pre-industrial levels and concluded
that, to avoid those effects, we would need to halve
Over the past few years, “political will” has become
our global emis-sions in the next twelve years.
commonplace in environmental politics – a byword
Financial capacity: a rapid transition to a zero-emisfor some mysterious missing resource that would,
sions world would be financially difficult but by no
were we to harness it, unleash a wave of global
means impossible, and it would certainly save jobs
action to stop climate change.2 In Katowice, I heard
and money compared to the alternative. (According
“political will” invoked often enough to make for an
to a recent U.S. government report that the Trump
excellent drinking game. The call came from the
Administration tried to bury by releasing it on Black
press: “Limiting warming to 1.5C is possible – if there Friday, a business-as-usual approach to climate
is political will,” ran a Guardian headline; “Countries policy would slice 10% off America’s GDP by 2100.)
struggle to muster political will to tackle climate
Technical capacity: renewable energy is readily
crisis,” wrote the Climate Action Network. From
available and easily scalable – it has been for quite
activists and academics: “The main difference
some time. Environmental science, environmenbetween possibility and impossibility is just political tal economics, and environmental technology are
will,” pronounced Chris Weber of the World Wildlife
soldiers ready for deployment, waiting for an order
Fund; “The final tick box is political will,” said Jim
from their commander-in-chief: politics.3
Skea, a prominent climate scientist. And from UN
And yet the desperate search for political will, even
officials, most frequently UN Secretary-General
when all these other elements stand at the ready,
Antonio Guterres, who raced from conference room
to conference room extolling “leadership and ambi- indicates that somewhere along the line a grave
misstep has occurred. For decades, the modern
tion … the political will to fight climate change …

9

environmental movement has operated with an
implicit assumption that if the science were unanimous, the technology available, and the economics
sound – and if we could convince everyone of those
evident truths – then good environmental politics
would follow. This equation has now proven itself
false many times over. Today, most Americans do
believe that climate change is real: according to the
Yale Climate Opinion Map for 2018, 70 percent of
Americans believe global warming is happening,
77 percent support regulating carbon dioxide emissions, and 79 percent believe schools should teach
about global warming. We have all the sufficient
conditions, but the politics have not followed.4
So the question then becomes: why is it that the
modern environmental political movement has
been unable to generate political will? Three explanations are often proposed. Journalists, who tend
to search for proximate causes, have shown how
self-interested and often corrupt industries – energy
producers, Big Agra, car manufacturers – have lobbied against environmental regulation with a success unrivalled in modern times (except, perhaps,
by cigarette companies). Historians have focused
on how the environmental movements have confronted those industries, and why those confrontations
have failed. And political theorists, their philosophically-inclined confrères, have homed in on our
ethical assumptions about what we, as carbonproducing citizens of developed nations, owe to
our fellow humans.5
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history, the natural world was defined as that which
was outside the political. Annabel Brett’s essay,
which is the first in the collection and focuses on
early modern Europe, argues that this distinction
between “nature” and “the political” lies at the core
of the modern Western political tradition. With few
exceptions, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
European intellectuals defined politics as “centrally
concerned with relations between human beings, not
between human beings and anything else.” Animals
could have “natural rights,” but never political ones;
the same went for land. This was because admission
into the political realm required agency – the ability
to articulate and to act on decisions. These “strong
conditions on agency,” Brett concludes, “mean that
conceptions of the land as an agent or partner in
[political] community…are very hard to find.”

The only way that nature could take on a political
meaning was through the idea of a homeland, or
patria. Brett cites Henning Arnisaeus and Alberico
Gentili, two seventeenth-century political scientists
who argued that one’s “native soil” played an important role in determining one’s political community.
Arnisaeus used this idea of patria to argue against
dual-citizenship. Gentili, writing of the Roman
destruction of Carthage, proposed that our native
land, “the region to which our eyes have become
accustomed,” not only gave us a distinct nationality
but also shaped the way we see the world – and so
one’s political affinities become tethered to one’s
location. But, as Brett acknowledges, the kind of politics that patria provides – narrowly local and often
Although each of these explanations is true, the
nationalistic – is not a desirable tradition for the
three books under review point to a deeper and per- modern environmental movement to take up. And it
haps more fundamental problem with environmental remains an exception to the rule: for early modern
politics. Their methodological approach is to focus
Europeans, the natural world had no place in politics.
on the evolution of the words and concepts that have
shaped our environmental concerns. Taken together, This anti-political idea of nature remains baked
they offer an intellectual history – inevitably incom- into the more recent concept of “the environment.”
plete and sometimes scattershot, but nonetheless
As Paul de Warde, Libby Robin, and Sverker Sorlin
crucial and enlightening – of some five-hundred
(all environmental historians) demonstrate in The
years of Western ideas of nature and their relationEnvironment: A History of the Idea, the term only
ship to politics. To survey that history is to realize
entered the English lexicon in the mid-1820s. In
just how absent concerns about the natural world
1827, British reactionary Thomas Carlyle borrowed
have been in our political traditions. And it is also
the word from the French environs – “surroundings”
to realize that when the environment did become
– and used it to describe the circumstances that
political, it carried with it an intellectual genealshaped great men. This definition of “environment”
ogy that has hamstrung the modern environmental
as “those extrinsic conditions that shape the real
movement to this day.
object of the study or story” remained dominant in
Europe for most of the nineteenth century. The enviII
ronment changed us, affected the way we act – but it
was never a protagonist, and thus always peripheral
We might begin with the unfortunate truth that for
to the (human) world of politics. When sociologists
much of Western history the natural world was
such as Herbert Spencer and early ecologists began
not just outside the political realm; “nature” and
to narrow the term to mean natural surroundings,
“politics” were antithetical to one another. That is
this anti-political sense continued to hold. The envithe main theme of Nature, Action and the Future, a
ronment could influence political actors, but it was
collection of essays assembled by Katrina Forrester itself a stable, agentless force. The idea of “enviand Sophie Smith. Though both Forrester and Smith ronmental politics” in Carlyle’s time would be an oxynow teach political theory (at Harvard and Oxford,
moron. Slowly, in fits and starts over the course of
respectively), both studied history at Cambridge, and the nineteenth and early twenty centuries, “environNature, Action and the Future is a welcome attempt mental politics” began to make sense – not because
to bridge those two disciplines by “showing how the
our idea of “the environment” moved closer to the
history of political thought can be used to address
political realm, but because politicizing the natural
environmental problems.” (Quentin Skinner, the
world became a useful tool for the state.
godfather of the Cambridge school of intellectual
history, which emphasizes the importance of always The historical essays in Nature, Action and the
locating ideas in their precise historical moments,
Future trace this development across multiple
contributes an afterword to the collection.) In order European countries. In Germany, resource manto “place environmental ideas into a wider political,
agement – especially of wood and forested land –
economic, and philosophical context,” Forrester
offered a welcome avenue for the state to extend
and Smith have assembled a group of historians of
its control into local politics (as local as a single
Western political thought—who are not experts on
farm) that were previously beyond its boundaries.
environmental history—and have asked them to con- Thus one finds nineteenth-century German politisider how the thinkers they study conceived of the
cians calling for a coordinated effort to regulate
relationship between politics and the natural world. the timber industry and forest management, an
effort that, in the words of one German forester,
“only the state can manage.” Likewise in England,
In response to that prompt, many of the essays in
this book simply and convincingly deny the premise: where prominent naturalists like James Hutton
argued that the safeguarding of woodlands and
there is no way to understand environmental ideas
prudent husbandry of soils required “the wisdom
in a political context, because for much of Western

of the legislature” to guard against self-interested landowners who might exhaust the nation’s
resources. The environment had become political,
but only as a means for government expansion.
It was not (yet) an end unto itself.
Resource management meant extending politics
into nature. But it also had the effect of granting
the environment that key political quality – agency –
that it formerly lacked. Malcolm Bull, in his fascinating essay on the idea of idleness in mid-20th
century environmental economics, offers this telling
quotation from a 1926 speech by Gifford Pinchot,
head of the US Forest Service and later the Governor
of Pennsylvania:

political thinkers. “Ideas are not just shaped by lone
people,” they write, “but just as much in conference
halls and laboratories.” Our modern concept of the
environment, in particular, “became the aggregate
of techniques and institutions that shaped the idea
more than individuals.” That, incidentally, is a criticism that we might direct at Smith and Forrester’s
collection, whose essays tend to focus on precisely the elite theory and lone scribblers that The
Environment wants to eschew.

This shift in focus from the individual to the
institutional is one of the great strengths of The
Environment. But if Smith and Forrester perhaps
lean too heavily on a small group of writers who
come to represent all of political thought, Warde,
We have vast stretches of idle forest land. It
Robin and Sorlin suffer from the opposite problem.
brings no good to anyone. It pays little or no taxes, Their approach invites a frustrating, vague passivkeeps willing hands out of work, builds no roads, ity: while it may be true that “the environment was
supports no industries, kills railroads, depopunobody’s intention,” readers do need a story to hold
lates towns, creates a migratory population, all of onto, and Warde, Robin and Sorlin refuse to settle
which work against a good and stable citizenship. for a clear cast of historical actors.
Idle forest serves no one well. It is a menace to
our normal national life.
In chapters on the study of population growth, ecology and climate change, The Environment builds
Pinchot personifies the land, but not in a traditional toward its central claim: that the modern history of
(or biblical) Mother-Nature way. Here the idle for“the environment” is that of an ever-ballooning conest is the idle citizen, a deadbeat who forfeits her
cept under which local concerns swelled into “global
obligations – her political duties – to her community. objects.” In the 1960s, a group of neo-Malthusian
In other words, it had become possible to speak of
population theorists – led by Paul Ehrlich and his
nature as a truly political entity, an agent in a symbi- bestselling work The Population Bomb – popularized
otic relationship with human beings. This language
a view of the world which “saw resources as a finite
stuck: in 1961 another head of the Forest Service,
part of a global system.” The idea of a resource-limEdward Cliff, another head of the Forest Service,
ited, interconnected Earth also seeped into ecolechoed Pinchot when he declared that “nonproducogy, a field once concerned with localized studies
tive, misused and idle woodlands will add nothing to of conservation techniques that rapidly turned its
the economic and cultural foundation upon which
attention in the 1970s to models of a global ecosysour future as a nation and a civilization depend.” As tem in which even the smallest of local shifts could
Bull notes, the idea of having “full employment” of
have planet-wide effects. And with the widespread
natural resources – and the notion that the natural
recognition of climate change that began in the
world could, by remaining idle, shirk its civic duties 1980s, “the environment” came to represent not only
– meant that there was no meaningful distinction
a global natural world, but also a global civilization.
between the idleness of men and the idleness of
If the environment “encompassed the whole planet,”
nature. Both were political concerns. (The idea that
and if our (local) actions were shaping its character,
the state should correct for economic idleness in
then we needed a global forum to figure out how to
its citizens is a development in political economy
act. By the late 1980s, “the environment” had become
that we ought to scrutinize outside of its environ“an expertise that created a new global politics.”
mental implications – though that is perhaps beyond
the scope of these books, and certainly beyond the
Which brings us to what we have today: a global
scope of this review.)
politics of the environment that places a premium
on predictions, models, expertise, and a sense of
This remarkable conceptual shift marks the begininterconnectedness. Every year we receive the latest
ning of the modern history of “the environment.” It is round of climate forecasts from the IPCC, a body
also where Nature, Action and the Future hands off
that commands respect in international climate
its historical account to The Environment. Though
politics precisely because it is apolitical: an interWarde, Robin and Sorlin begin their history of the
national group of scientists who evaluate thousands
environment in the mid-1800s with Carlyle, they
of papers and models and condense them into one
date the modern environmental era to 1948, a year
set of objective forecasts for policymakers. Those
in which two bestselling polemics that warned
policymakers then attend a series of UN-hosted conof a coming environmental apocalypse – William
ferences – like COP24 this past December – at which
Vogt’s Road to Survival and Fairfield Osborn’s Our
the IPCC scientists present their report and try to
Plundered Planet – signaled the inauguration of a
convince all the world’s nations to turn their science
new way of thinking about our relationship to nature. into politics. More often than not, those attempts
The modern concept of “environment” was shaped,
fail. But what we do get are more reports – more
the authors argue, by four political fixations of the
models, predictions, and deference to experts – from
postwar era: an urge to make predictions (often
a host of acronymed international bodies like UNEP,
apocalyptic ones) about the future of our planet;
UNFCCC and IEA. And so this cycle, which produces
a deference to scientific expertise to judge those
what Warde, Robin and Sorlin call “an internationally
predictions; a faith in the numbers and models
active and restlessly conferencing alliance of scienthat constituted that expertise; and a tendency to
tists” but fails to translate that international science
expand the scope of those models to a global level,
into international politics, continues.
and so transform “the environment” from a term
about local circumstances to a “truly global issue,
Warde, Robin and Sorlin argue that this history
which could be scaled to any nation and locality, and underscores the main problem with our current
[which] no nation could treat … in isolation.” Warde,
state of affairs: our idea of “the environment” is
Robin and Sorlin set out to document how that trans- now global, but our politics are not. We have proven
formation occurred.
ourselves capable of conceiving of nature as a single
interconnected ecosystem – that is the intellectual
To do this, they make an explicit shift away from the journey traced in The Environment. But we cantendency in intellectual history to trace the develnot yet do the same for politics. (“The Earth Is One
opment of an idea by scrutinizing the scribblings
but the World Is Not,” they title one of their chapof a lineage (often quite an arbitrary one) of famous
ters.) The politics that take place inside our global
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environmental institutions remain “stubbornly
anti-planetary politics would look like. To “glimpse”
local.” They conclude that “Environmental politics
Climate X, they urge us to “bundle together the most
has been, in large part, a history of trying to build
radical strategies of the climate justice movement –
political institutions that could match the scope and mass boycott, divestment, strike, blockade, reciambition of the concept.”
procity.” But it is difficult to imagine that bundle as
anything more than a jumble of angry voices, and
What we have, then, is a history in which our idea of Climate Leviathan’s appeal to “Climate X” never
nature has remained out of sync with our idea of the manages to transcend the understandable but
political, the one forever circling the other as though unhelpful stage of protest that cries “down with the
in gimbal lock. Where once “the environment” was
system!” over and over again.
a concept trying to catch up to the requirements of
politics, now our understanding of “the political” is
Mann and Wainwright’s valuable focus on economstruggling to catch up to the requirements of “the
ics and their discussion of Climate Leviathan make
environment.” That is the history – and the present
their book far more interesting than the other two
dilemma – that these two books offer us.
under review here. “Any substantial attempt to
come to grips with climate change must contend
III
with capitalism,” they write. And their contention is
that capitalism, with its insatiable drive for growth
When we do reach a coherent form of environmental and progress and its proclivity to encourage vast
politics – when the scope of the political aligns with inequality, has stymied and will continue to stymie
the scope of “the environment” – what will that look
humane environmental politics at every turn. The
like? That is the opening question in Geoff Mann
“liberal, capitalist order” is what makes our idea of
and Joel Wainwright’s Climate Leviathan: A Political
politics incompatible with care for the environment.
Theory of our Planetary Future. Like many of the
“Capitalism may not be the only problem” facing the
contributors to Nature, Action and the Future, Mann environmental movement, they concede. “But it is
and Wainwright are not specialists in environmental surely one of the big ones.”
politics, and their primary academic interests – in
political economy and critiques of liberal capitalism The idea that the modern environmental movement
– guide their foray into climate change. Unlike those has been undermined by global capitalism is not
contributors, though, Mann and Wainwright don’t
new. Naomi Klein, a journalist and academic whose
want to plumb the genealogies of our current envi2014 bestseller This Changes Everything made her
ronmental concepts. Theirs is a “speculative mode”
the darling of environmental activists the world
styled after Hobbes (whence the title) and Marx, two over, has argued that environmental politics began
thinkers who wrote during moments of acute politin earnest at the precise moment (1988, she says)
ical crisis where an old order seemed to be fading
that liberal capitalism triumphed over communism
and a new one had yet to come into view. Though
and economic globalization took off. This confluthis self-conscious emulation feels overblown (this
ence was, Klein suggests, the ultimate roadblock to
book is no Communist Manifesto), it does allow
climate action. She memorably termed it a case of
Mann and Wainwright to adopt a more biting polem- “epic bad timing.”
ical tone. Climate Leviathan is a helpful reminder
that political theorists should offer something more But the history of our idea of the environment
ambitious than the dry thought experiments – what
sketched by these three books suggests that the
Clifford Geertz called “the little stories Oxford
simultaneous rise of the modern idea of “the enviphilosophers like to make up for themselves” – that
ronment” and the kind of liberal, capitalist, global
have overrun the field.
economy that Climate Leviathan condemns is not
simply a case of “bad timing.” Rather, our conception
Climate Leviathan takes as its premise the concluof a global capitalist economy and our conception of
sion to which Nature, Action and the Future and The “the environment” share several striking similarities.
Environment have led us. “Our technical understand- The four dimensions that shaped the modern idea
ing of the physical processes driving climate change of “the environment” – predictive; scientific; modhas run far ahead of our explanations of the social
ellable; and almost infinitely scalable – could just
and political processes driving these physical proas well apply to a globalized capitalist economy.
cesses,” write Mann and Wainwright. They want to
know what will happen when our conception of polit- Though Mann and Wainwright never make this
ical processes catches up to our idea of environmen- connection explicit, reading Climate Leviathan with
tal ones. They assume that our modern idea of the
these two other histories in the background makes
environment and our idea of politics are, by virtue of it difficult to ignore. Perhaps this is part of why we
climate change, bound to collide within the next few have such trouble aligning “the environment” with
decades. One will change to accommodate the other. the political – not because our idea of the natural
world lies beyond the bounds of what counts in
According to Mann and Wainwright, that alignment
politics, but because our contemporary idea of the
could play out in four “formations” that fall along two environment relies on the same conceptual tools as
different axes: capitalist or non-capitalist, and “plan- does our current political economy. If this is indeed
etary sovereignty” or “anti-planetary sovereignty.”
true, it would force environmentalists to confront
A capitalist and planetary regime – which they believe an uncomfortable paradox. Our modern idea of “the
to be the most likely response to climate change
environment,” which we so often invoke to summon
– they call “Climate Leviathan.” (Think the UN, but
our fellow citizens to climate action, is part of the
with more power.) A capitalist and anti-planetary
same intellectual history – the same family tree –
order leaves us with “Climate Behemoth,” where
as the global capitalist politics that, if we buy
each nation regulates its own environment and the
Mann and Wainwright’s argument, is antithetical
idea of a global system is scuttled— something like
to climate action.
Trumpism. “Climate Mao” would mean a non-capitalist but planetary system: authoritarian, but appealIV
ing because it might yield quick action against
carbon emitters. And a non-capitalist, anti-planetary In his infamous 1969 essay, “Meaning and
sovereignty system – which would require a political Understanding in the History of Ideas,” Quentin
economy that is neither communist nor capitalist,
Skinner ruthlessly scolded historians and political
national nor global – they label “Climate X.”
theorists for deriving “dateless wisdom” and “universal ideas” from historical texts. This search for
Although Climate X is what Mann and Wainwright
“perennial questions” was, he asserted, poor scholwant us to move toward, they fail to provide any
arship. And it was also a very narrow-minded way
meaningful description of what an anti-capitalist,
of learning from the past. Historians of political

thought ought not to rummage through history in
search of old answers to our current political questions. Rather, Skinner argued, the point of documenting how ideas change over time is to discover
questions and concepts that are not familiar to us
today. We can use the past as a way to imagine a different future – to realize that “we may be freer than
we sometimes suppose.” Annabel Brett, who studied
under Skinner, puts his mantra well in a more recent
essay: “In trying to unravel the mental worlds of the
past, we give ourselves the opportunity to re-weave
our own.”6
Can these histories of our idea of “the environment”
and its intersection (or lack thereof) with political
thought give us the tools to re-weave our contemporary idea of environmental politics? In his afterword
to Nature Action and the Future, Skinner backs away
from his normally-hopeful stance that intellectual
history can free us in the present. He strikes a much
more despondent tone. “We are ill-equipped by our
inherited traditions of thinking about the natural
world to deal adequately with our current predicament,” he writes. “The more one contemplates the disjunction between what is scientifically necessary and
what is politically possible, the more it seems hard to
end on anything but a deeply pessimistic note.”

and diplomats paced the halls of the UN Climate
Conference in Katowice this past month bemoaning
(and contributing to) a lack of “political will,” perhaps
they were getting at a more profound – and, we might
fear, a more intractable – historical problem.
And yet Skinner’s pessimism undermines his own
earlier argument about what the history of ideas
can do for us in the present. Good intellectual
history helps to reveal the origins of our current
predicaments. A certain amount of fatalism is to be
expected – the ideas that got us into this mess are
unlikely to be the ones that will get us out. But the
point of Skinner’s 1969 essay was to suggest that we
could look to history, and especially the history of
political thought, to find different ideas, long-forgotten and discarded, that could offer us a new way of
thinking about a dilemma in the present.

With these three books, historians of political
thought have done an excellent job of showing why
our inherited traditions in the West have left us
ill-prepared to face climate change – and why we
have largely excluded the environment from our
politics altogether. The task for those historians now
is to shrug off late-Skinner’s pessimism and follow
early-Skinner’s method. We must search for those
past traditions which, precisely because they have
It is true that after reading these three books that
not shaped our impotent idea of environmental
document the way we have thought about the natural politics in the present, might offer us some hope
world across some five-hundred years of Western
for the future.
history, one might come away thinking that we are
trapped. The way we think about nature is strongly
rooted in a kind of anti-politics. And when our idea
of “the environment” did make its way toward the
political realm, it ended up overshooting the political entirely and gave us an environmental politics
that is too global, too technical, and perhaps too
reliant on the same intellectual structures that
sustain the kind of political economy that seems
only to exacerbate climate change. When delegates

1 Shannon Osaka, “This Year’s UN Climate Talks – Brought
to You by Coal?” Grist (4 December 2018): https://grist.org/
article/this-years-u-n-climate-talks-brought-to-you-by-coal/.
2 I draw on Bill McKibben’s language from a 2014 article in the
New York Review of Books, in which he concluded that “the
resource [that we need is] … political will, which is infinitely
renewable. If we can get it going” (Bill McKibben, “Climate:
Will We Lose the Endgame?” New York Review of Books [10
July 2014]: https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/07/10/
climate-will-we-lose-endgame/).
3 IPCC, “SR 1.5: Global Warming of 1.5 oC” (2018): https://
www.ipcc.ch/sr15/; USGCRP, “Fourth National Climate
Assessment” (2018): https://nca2018.globalchange.gov.
4 See http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/
ycom-us-2018/?est=worried&type=value&geo=county.
5 There are of course far too many good texts of environmental journalism, history, and political theory to cite here. But
I will offer a representative (and recent) example from each
field. For journalism, see Hiroko Tabuchi, “The Oil Industry’s

Covert Campaign to Rewrite American Car Emissions Rules,”
New York Times (13 December 2018): https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/12/13/climate/cafe-emissions-rollback-oil-industry.html; for history, see Andreas Malm, Fossil Capital: The
Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming (New
York: Verso, 2016) and Thomas G. Andrews, Killing for Coal:
America’s Deadliest Labor War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2010); for political theory, see Simon
Caney’s numerous articles about climate justice: https://
simoncaney.weebly.com/climate-justice.html. A notable
exception to my (very rough) generalizations about how these
three fields have approached environmental politics is the
work of Jedediah Purdy, who has attempted the kind of intellectual history of the environment that is similar to that of
the works discussed in this essay. See Jedediah Purdy, After
Nature: A Politics for the Anthropocene (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2015).
6 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History
of Ideas” in Visions of Politics, Volume I: Regarding Method
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57-89;
Annabel Brett, “What is intellectual history now?” in D.
Cannadine ed., What is history now? (London: Palgrave Press,
2002), 128.
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DRAWINGS
ALEJANDRO NODARSE
These drawings and this poem (overleaf)
were part of a January show at the Ezra
Stiles College gallery called (De)positions:
An Homage to Pontormo, conceived by
Alejandro Nodarse.
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POEM

Not around but under, through,

MARGARET (MIGS) GRABAR SAGE

between the bones or whatever holds
you up. There will be no
touching you now. Just burrowing
burrowing through to the bottom of you
however bright or brined in death, however sorry
I’ll be to sink my flighty fingers in
where your splinters split so thin they flow.

The place is sterile, coldest bath
of sunlight save on me, in aging flesh
with toes already pointing off of cliffs
I’ve never seen. The bodies here are strung
like rubber bands from peg to peg.

The bodies here are clothed in water
like the rain-clouds, like I hope
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they would have wanted. I am bound
by nothing solid save the rinds,
the crusts and pits and peels that lie
in waves along the sand when all has dried
and I have gone to tide me over.

Note: This poem imagines the inner life of Jacopo Pontormo
as he painted his dazzling Deposition on the Cross. It was
written as part of a multidisciplinary exhibit centered on
reinterpreting the painting as well as the painter himself. This
poem is a sort of ekphrasis on the painting, but it also draws
on Pontormo’s diaries, in which he recorded what foods he ate
nearly every day, along with other details of consumption—quotidian worries over waste and the passage of time. A typical
entry goes like this: “Saturday, fasted. Sunday evening, which
was the evening of Palm Sunday, I ate a little boiled mutton
and salad, and had to eat three quattrini of bread.” Sometimes
the painter records how his body feels, and often he sketches
in the margins of the journal. On June 9th, 1554, all he writes
is this: “Marco Moro began to prepare the walls and fill in the
cracks in San Lorenzo.” Such lines are a reminder of everything
these “diaries,” an obsessive and idiosyncratic set of records,
lack. But there is also something marvelous in these unrehearsed observations, a poetry if you will, that makes me think
I’m getting just a little closer to the painter himself.

REVIEWED

FARMING
WHILE BLACK:

SOUL FIRE FARM'S
PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO LIBERATION
ON THE LAND

LIBERATION
BY SOIL
ASHIA AJANI

LEAH PENNIMAN
CHELSEA GREEN PUBLISHING
368 PAGES I $22.72
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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RECOGNIZES THAT ENVIRONMENTAL BURDENS,
such as industrial factory placement and lack of
access to healthy food, are also matters of race, gender and socioeconomic status. The concept arguably
hails back to the Civil Rights Movement and has
evolved so that its work no longer only involves combatting the unequal distribution of environmental
burdens. It is also a rallying cry to return to sustainable, communal roots. Alongside proponents of liberation work––the effort to redefine our relationship
to the current state, to take institutional power and
return that power to people who have been historically marginalized––proponents of environmental
justice are committed to creating alternatives to
extractivist farming techniques, which cause soil
erosion, water pollution and rely heavily on pesticides and other chemicals. By growing our own food,
creating our own markets, and rebuilding our own
communities––thus asserting our autonomy on the
land––we subvert the notion that we are reliant on
current, oppressive systems for survival.
On Soul Fire Farm, a seventy-two acre farm in
upstate New York that is on the original territory of
the Mohawk and Munsee people, Leah Penniman
and her team live out the principles of environmental justice and liberation work. There they grow
healthy, organic produce that is rooted in the cultural histories of Black and Brown people. Okra, cassava, leafy greens and herbs fill the wide expanse of
hills. Children ages five through eighteen weed, sow
and cook produce. Sometimes they go on scavenger hunts in the surrounding forest. They speak to
the trees; the trees communicate back to them by
sharing water and anaerobic resources. On the land
of Soul Fire Farm, everything seems a practice of
symbiosis.
In Farming While Black: Soul Fire Farm’s Practical
Guide to Liberation on the Land (2018), Penniman,
the farm’s founder, uses her own experience on this

farm, historical analysis and reference, spiritual
practice, liberation politics, technical information,
and ecological science to create a holistic guide to
tending the land, written specifically for people of
color interested in the sustainable food movement.
Farming While Black reads like a basic instruction
manual for how to acquire land and establish your
farm business. Yet Penniman has greater ambitions.
This book shows how deep the roots of removal,
oppression, and cultural innovation run in farming
and food practices. It is a testament to the ancestors who paved the way, and a call to return to our
ancestral ways of life through their farming practices, communal economics, and spiritual work.
Penniman founded Soul Fire Farm in 2011 with the
mission to “reclaim our inherent right to belong to
the earth and have agency in the food system as
Black and Brown people.” She describes herself as
a “multiracial, light-skinned, raised-rural, northeastern, college-educated, cisgendered, able-bodied,
Jewish-Vodun practicing biological mother who grew
up working class.” Growing up as a brown child in
a predominantly white community lead her to seek
empowerment and security in natural spaces. She
writes that the land will tell you when you belong to
it. When she visited plot of earth that would become
Soul Fire Farm, it told her to wait. She returned with
offerings, and the land welcomed her and her kin.
Part of Penniman’s mission is helping farmers of
color claim ownership of the land, which is particularly powerful given the lack of resources available
to Black farmers and non-Black farmers of color
in a world that largely depends on their labor and
innovation. Due to the history of slavery, oppression, and marginalization, Black and Native peoples
are frequently left out of larger discussions about
farming practices, or find it difficult to acquire loans
for land purchases. Penniman asserts that land
is the basis of liberation: how can people of color
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become liberated if they do not have access to land
resources? For her, redefining relationships to the
land is an important step toward land stewardship,
and an important step toward healing. Once we
stop seeing land as the thing that oppresses us, and
instead view it as the thing that has always protected us, the healing can begin.

ESSAY
DIMITRI DIAGNE

The book also serves as a call for white people
to reevaluate their relationship to the land. In a
section entitled “White People Uprooting Racism,”
Penniman discusses how the concept of whiteness
removes culture and ancestry from white identified
people by replacing European roots with a false
origin. Whiteness has no origin rooted in place. It is
an ideology used to oppress other groups of people.
Penniman later provides discussion questions about
cultural appropriation, what it means to be anti-racist
versus non-racist, and how white people can be better
advocates for marginalized people. How do these
skills relate to land stewardship and agriculture?
White people own upwards of ninety-eight percent
of the rural land in the United States, whereas Black
people own about one percent, and most ancestral
indigenous land is held in “trusts” by the United
States federal government. Penniman calls for white
advocates to redistribute their unearned wealth, have
tough conversations about race and inequality with
other white people, and invest their time and money
in historically marginalized communities.
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For someone unfamiliar with the agricultural industry, Farming While Black may seem overwhelming
and complicated. Penniman has gathered a lot of
material, ranging from the practice of squatting
and how it can be a form of temporary land tenure to agroforestry for soil restoration. It is a thick,
difficult read. But as we come upon an era of both
self-reflection and environmental (social) crisis, it
is a necessary tool in the fight against injustice and
climate change. It not only provides history, but it
treats the knowledge and application of that history
as a solution to many problems, whether they be
racial, socioeconomic or environmental. What would
the world look like if farms followed the model of
sustainable, culturally-significant agriculture that is
embodied by Soul Fire Farm? What if students had a
place where they could learn not only about agriculture, but about the legacies of innovation and resistance to historical models of agriculture? What if we
all remembered that we came from somewhere, and
that while intergenerationally we have experienced
pain and removal, there are productive steps we can
take and a community to remind us that we have
purpose and worth?
One has to question the applicability of farming
techniques in upstate New York to farms in places
like Phoenix, Arizona or Seattle, Washington, where
the weather and the growability of various crops differ greatly. But Penniman does not set out to create
a blanket solution to global or even national agricultural problems. What she does is provide the reader
with options and perspectives—even readers who are
not looking to get involved with agricultural systems
directly. Penniman emphasizes movement building
and the ways consumers can combat exploitative
agriculture practices through boycotts, economic
and emotional support, and by teaching children
about sustainable, intersectional agriculture.
More than anything, Farming While Black asks us to
recognize that food is not just something we eat. It
is not just a commodity or something with which we
nourish our bodies. It has significant cultural and
ecological roots that we cannot ignore. When someone knows where their food comes from, when they
have meaningful involvement in the cultivation and
protection of the land that births their food, they are
much more willing to protect Mother Earth, to see
other human beings as their siblings in the reverence of earth systems.
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FINDING EUROPE
DIMITRI DIAGNE
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IN BUDAPEST, IN THE SQUARE OUTSIDE ST. ISTVÁN BASILICA, there
is a Christmas market. After worrying about a truck
attack for a split second, I entered. They were selling Christmas market things—mulled wine, hot chocolate, fried dough, fruit brandy, smiling snowmen,
plastic reindeer, Santa figurines of varying quality. It
was overcast and drizzling. I pictured Christ in the
temple, turning over merchant’s stands, long hair
disheveled and plastered to his face, sweeping his
arms across counters full of pastries, the flesh of
salmon and fowl, metal boxes of forints, euros, and
dollars, ripping down strands of LED lights. Maybe
next year a conceptual artist will dress in linen
robes and take up this task. Maybe the members
of an artist collective will go to all the Christmas
markets of Europe and do it at the same time, some
dressed in linen robes, some dressed as Charlie
Brown.
For all their cheap commercialism, Christmas
markets bring joy to many. The posh and artfully-lit promenades of Central Budapest, which
host the main Christmas market, are packed with
people marching in tight formation from Lacoste
to Intimissimi Italian lingerie to Zara Home, each
storefront dripping with icicle lights, an enormous
glowing tree guiding the way. Stepping into a side
street feels like stepping out of a slow but powerful
river full of eddies that disorient and terrify. I prefer
the slightly quieter, stranger quarters. The Ottoman
bathhouse where, for about twenty dollars, you can
sit in a 500-year-old stone tub with old Hungarian
men in linen loincloths for unlimited time; the tiny
bar operated semi-legally by an English immigrant
of Afro-Caribbean origin and frequented by an
alt-looking crowd; the bookstore-café owned by the
publisher of László Krasznahorkai’s mind-bending
novels. I even prefer St. István in the rain.
From there, I walked towards the parliament,
through the kind of neighborhood that surrounds

important government offices. The streets were
clean and quiet, the buildings grand and featureless.
Like many somewhat famous and extraordinarily
photogenic buildings, especially those that imitate
old styles, the Parliament’s Gothic Revival structure
was quite boring in person, a strained and self-conscious attempt at an anachronistic form of beauty.
I left quickly. The sun began emerging from the
clouds as I boarded a yellow tram. It took me along
the Danube, on whose far bank Buda’s monumental
architecture lay bathed in golden evening light.
Budapest looks like a city someone would design
in Forge of Empires or some other online strategy
game. Looking across the river from Pest into Buda,
one sees a Baroque palace in front of a Gothic
church. Next to that a colossal statue of an angel
hovers over a medieval citadel, behind a sprawling
Beaux-Arts hotel-bathhouse. At first glance, there
is very little to indicate that we are no longer in the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. The historical jumble
of styles, expressed in their most grandiose forms,
easily reads against the late-afternoon backdrop as
a piece of propaganda artwork, a testament to what
a particular element of Europe sees in a particular
section of history. It is distinctly Western, distinctly
opulent, distinctly built to project the grandness
of what many would like to interpret as a distinctly
grand European civilization.
***
Several hundred miles to the south, in Montenegro,
the distinction is less clear. The country prides
itself on being the only part of the Balkans that
remained at least partially autonomous throughout
the entire Ottoman period. Popular history holds
that the Empire’s forces were no match for its rugged land and its rugged, warlike clans—one of which
my maternal great-grandmother was a member.
A Montenegrin acquaintance offered me a more

skeptical revision of this story. He suggested that
the jagged limestone plateaus covered with scrappy
oak trees were not worth the effort to conquer, so it
didn’t take much to convince the Ottomans to stop
trying. In any case, Montenegro held out for hundreds of years despite being completely surrounded
by Ottoman territory. Meanwhile, on the Empire’s far
northern frontier, the Hungarians toiled on the ramparts of the antemurale christianitatis, the symbolic
wall between Christian Europe and the Muslim East.

Look at a satellite image of Central Asia and these
boundaries seem absurd, as they ford rivers, wind
through deserts, and cut across mountain ranges
and language families. One could make the same
observation of the US-Mexico border west of the Rio
Grande, and of countless other fronteirs. The meaning of such a border is not geographic, linguistic,
cultural, or ecological. Political boundaries denote
the area over which the international community,
or some powerful element of that community, has
acknowledged the sovereign authority of a particuPerhaps it is out of a feeling of solidarity, then, that
lar nation state. Of course this state sovereignty is
Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s authoritarian Prime Minister amended, suspended, violated, and ignored so freand President of the far-right Fidesz Party, donated
quently that it rarely exists in its pure form, revealtwenty-five kilometers of a new antemurale, in the
ing just how contrived political borders are.
form of barbed wire, to Montenegro this past summer. I first heard about this gift through that same
The borders of continents tend to be less arbitrary
Montenegrin acquaintance, who dryly and half-jokthan those of countries. They are delineated less by
ingly hypothesized that Montenegro might achieve
compromises and treaties than by geology. Floating
long-awaited EU accession by becoming part of a
on the slurry of molten rock miles below Earth’s
growing right wing-coalition. This informal group,
surface, there is a North American Plate, a South
spearheaded by Hungary’s Orbán, and including
American Plate, an African Plate, an Australian Plate,
the leadership of Austria, Italy, Poland, the Czech
an Antarctic Plate, and a Eurasian Plate, into which
Republic, and Slovakia, along with sizable minority
the Arabian and Indian Plates are smashed. Cracks
parties in France and Germany, is committed to
in the Earth’s crust tend to manifest in geographidrawing a particular kind of boundary for Europe.
cal features on the surface. South America erupts
Montenegro could decide to use Orbán’s gift and
suddenly the bottleneck of the Panamanian Isthmus.
join in this mission. The Hungarian Prime Minister
Australia and Antarctica are surrounded by ocean.
almost certainly intends the barbed wire to run
The Mediterranean and the deep trench of the Red
along Montenegro’s southern border with either of
Sea separate Africa from Eurasia. But at what point
two majority-Muslim countries—Albania and Kosovo. on that great landmass does Europe begin?
In an age of globalization, it would help affirm an
image of Europe as a bastion of Christendom, a
A high school history teacher of mine described
sharply delineated West.
Europe as a fractal pattern of peninsulas sticking
out from the northwest corner of Asia. For hundreds
In the face of immigration from majority-Muslim
of years, powerful people who lived on this conticountries, this ancient and strange mission of
nental outgrowth have tried to define its eastern
walling off a particular version of Europe is becomboundary. Even when it concerns spaces that, like
ing increasingly fashionable and visible. It is also
continents, aren’t inherently political, geography is
practically impossible—and morally unjustifiable.
a politically involved practice. Because continents
Europe cannot be constituted as a fixed and uniform are understood to be rooted in the most concrete
cultural and geographical region, especially in a con- physical reality, they may offer the most stable and
temporary world drawn together and also ravaged
irrefutable identity around which to organize politiby the inequities of global late capitalism. It is these cally. Continents are more than tectonic plates—they
inequities that at once make European countries
become cultural associations, parties of solidardesirable destinations and create people in need of ity, which take on new political significance in the
destinations. Attempts to wall off Europe are a kind framework of transnational federations and organiof trans-boundary ethnonationalism, which, like all
zations. NAFTA, the African Union, and the EU are
instances of ethnonationalism, require a dishonall based on some notion of continental identity. As
est smoothing over of history. The idea of a white,
the EU expands, it becomes more and more geoChristian Europe that is fundamentally separate
graphically contiguous, constituting a territory of
requires rejecting the great historical truth that such adjoining states whose membership in the Union
a Europe is not real. Not only in the sense that the
can be held up to defend the idea, easily exploited
creation of the Western European powers was only
by conservative politicians and other xenophobes,
possible through exchange with African, Middle
that a culturally coherent Europe coincides with a
Eastern, South Asian, and East Asian societies, and
physically integral Europe. The latter gives the forlater, through the exploits of colonialism. But in the mer the legitimacy of material existence.
sense that Europe, as a coherent cultural and physical territory, has never really existed.
A physical definition turns Europe from a shakily
defined cultural construct to something literally set
***
in stone. But the lack of a clear geological boundary
leaves a physical definition dependent on cultural
A National Geographic world map hangs in my child- and political debate. The most successful strathood bedroom. Thanks to its decade-long presence, egy in this debate has continually proven to be the
I can recite most national capitals. I can draw from
identification of a cultural Other, a group whose
memory a decent outline of the Mediterranean
differences with every culture in whatever area
Sea. France is purplish-blue, Brazil is green, South
someone wants to define as “Europe” exceed the
Africa is yellow. Other countries are delineated by
differences between those cultures. Since the 8th
their own rings of color that fade to clean white as
century encounter between the Umayyad Caliphate
you move away from the borders, which appear as
and a Frankish Army led by Charles Martel, this
the crisp, sudden interfaces between two colors.
other has been Islam, later to be represented by the
Sometimes they are separated by the slender blue
Ottomans. The Other now takes the form of insidstrand of a river. Some follow the jagged ridge of
iously diffuse Middle Eastern and North African
a mountain range (Pyrenees is written above the
migrants whose stereotyped image stirs paranoia in
France–Spain border). Some seem to follow nothing the minds of many white Europeans, both Christian
in particular. These take the form of either straight
and non-Christian. This contemporary stereotype of
lines (curved to account for the map’s reduction of a the Other is not only Muslim, but also dark and poor.
spherical surface to a flat one) or convoluted mean- Each trait is enough to imply the others, and each
ders, like the vast squiggle between Kazakhstan and is enough to prohibit inclusion within the ideal of
Russia that bifurcates into the vast squiggles distin- Europe. Each represents something that those who
guishing Mongolia from Russia and China.
attempt to draw the boundaries of Europe see their
continent not to be, something they want to prevent
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their continent from becoming. This otherness
appears more legitimate, more fundamental, when it
is tied to some seemingly objective physical barrier—
the Central Asian nomads beyond the Ural River, the
Moors across the Strait of Gibraltar, or the Turks
and Levantines past the Bosporus. When the Muslim
Other is confined beyond the physical frontiers of
some contiguous area, Europe is no longer the subjective and viscous concept of Christendom or, even
more vaguely, Western Civilization, but a concrete,
stable, unchanging cultural and physical entity.
Of course, this immutable unity is largely a myth.
One reason is that groups characterized as Other
live within areas within any physical definition of
Europe. Along the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea,
completely surrounded by the majority Christian
countries of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia
and Greece, lie Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,
and Albania—three majority-Muslim countries. Most
members of their religious majorities trace the origin of their faith to the Ottoman conquest. The existence of these three countries is evidence enough
that no Christian definition of Europe can rely on
the physicality of the continent. The most it can do
is attempt to maintain literal fences and equally real
legal barriers between itself and its foil. This seems
to be the European Union’s working plan. A map of
the Schengen Area reveals a large hole, occupied
by the three majority-Muslim countries and three of
their four Christian neighbors. Croatia, the exception, appears with Romania and Bulgaria as part of
a buffer zone of European Union members that are
not part of the Schengen Area. The EU has made
it clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and
Kosovo, along with Serbia and Montenegro—which
both have significant Muslim minorities—are not
part of Europe.
***
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over a cup at the çajtore I frequent, whose name in
Albanian translates to “at the hut” and whose design,
with burlap wallpaper and bark-covered wood panels,
tries to emulate one. “Things are very bad here. Lots
of people leave for Europe.”
Europe, then, is a place to which one travels from
this country on the Balkan Peninsula. One goes there
to find functioning train systems, the rule of law, and
regulations that prevent power plants from pumping
brown coal smoke into grey winter air. An abundance
of jobs that don’t require having a well-positioned
relative, and the freedom to cross international borders in pursuit of those jobs, in search of education,
to meet relatives, in a way that—by declaration of the
EU—Kosovars cannot. Many people say that living
here can feel like being “trapped.”
A Kosovar Passport is one of the world’s least powerful. Citizens can travel to 14 countries visa-free,
and thirty-four with a visa on arrival. Not included
in this number is the United States, the powerful
ally that occupies a position of special reverence in
the minds of many Kosovar Albanians. Neither are
the countries of the European Union, whose flag
adorns public buildings and infrastructure projects
throughout the country. Getting a visa for Germany
or Switzerland, two of the most common destinations for Kosovar immigrants, requires a long wait
outside an embassy, a barrage of forms, a non-refundable fee of close to one hundred euros (no small
change in a country where unemployment hovers
around thirty percent and average monthly income
at around four hundred euros), and an understanding that in the end, you’re likely to be denied. It
is a process that many describe as humiliating.
Similarly humiliating might be boarding a plane at
the Stuttgart airport, where the flight to Kosovo is
sequestered in a small, old, far-flung terminal along
with flights to Hurghada, Egypt and Izmir, Turkey.
You have to pass through a special passport-check to
enter the gate area. The terminal serves as quarantine for less wealthy, darker-skinned, not-quite
Europeans. It contains a single food stand that sells
four-euro coffee.

As I was writing this piece, an article by the Bosniak
writer Riada Ašimović Akyol appeared in the
Atlantic. She argues that the nation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is living proof that Islam can exist in
Europe, and has indeed existed there for hundreds
of years. The standout sentence is the claim that
Europe is where the money and the power are. This
“Bosnian Muslims, Albanians, Turks, and others see
is a definitional statement, from the perspective
themselves as fully Muslim and fully European.”1
of many in Kosovo and in the region. Factions in
Akyol suggests that if those who define their conseveral former Yugoslav countries believe that by
tinent against Islam would get hip to the fact that
becoming European, they’ll get access to some
entire communities of Muslims are both indigeof that money and power. Hence the possibility of
nous to geographical Europe and proudly embrace
Montenegro allying with Orbán’s right wing EU front,
European identity, they could stop worrying so much to prove that they belong on the European side of
about whether recent Muslim arrivals can integrate
the antemurale. This is a long-standing trend. In
into European society. But this hopeful conclusion
Race and the Yugoslav Region, Catherine Baker
relies on a premise too general to describe the
relates how in the 1980s, members of Slovenia’s
process of identity formation in at least some parts nascent independence movement asserted their
of the Western Balkans. Hundreds of years of dis“Europeanness” to contrast themselves with the
course and conflict, combined with the EU’s current “Balkanness” of their neighboring Republics to the
politics of exclusion, have produced a more compli- South and East.2 Likewise with Croatian nationalists,
who could emphasize their Catholicism and relacated situation than the one Akyol describes. Most
people I’ve talked to in Kosovo, Albanians and Serbs tively pale skin. Slovenia and Croatia are both
members of the European Union. Kosovo is still
alike, do not consider themselves European.
waiting for its citizens to be deemed worthy of
traveling there.
Two minutes by foot from the new central mosque,
a gift from Turkey, the hottest bar in Mitrovica
As Jeton Zulfaj recently observed in Kosovo 2.0,
occupies an old Ottoman bathhouse. On the weekends, they’re known to turn people away on the basis a Kosovar online investigative journalism publication, the European Union’s refusal to grant Kosovo
of their outfits. Behind the counter is a display of
visa liberalization is likely at least partially due to
around thirty bottles of Cîroc vodka. At this bar, a
xenophobia.3 Unlike some nearby countries, Kosovo
couple of months ago, I made a sarcastic comment
can’t claim to participate in what EU members idenabout “you Europeans.” One of my friends chucktify as cultural Europeanness. Most Kosovars I’ve
led. “You think we’re European?” another asked,
met aren’t interested in becoming fully culturally
feigning flattery. I thought of geography in terms
European—if doing so requires assimilating comof the map in my bedroom wall. The people I was
pletely into a Western way of life that many reasonwith did not. On the other end of the local glamour
ably see as alienating, cold, and lonely. It seems that
spectrum are çajtores, small, sparse, unisex cafés
Kosovo must wait, then, for the European Union to
where men gather to talk and gamble over tiny,
hourglass-shaped cups of strong black tea that cost abandon the practice of basing political, social, and
economic inclusion on some notion of European
twenty cents each. “Some young people here can’t
cultural uniformity.
even afford one of these,” an acquaintance told me

In the endless debates over whether recent arrivals
will be able to integrate into European culture and
adopt European values, it is easy to forget the premise behind these concepts—the contrast between
Europe and not-Europe. A fence cannot be built
around Europe. A line from mountain range, to river,
to sea cannot mark a barrier between European
culture and the Other. Europe’s economic power,
reinforced by a continual reduction of the bodies
of Black and Brown and not-quite-white people into
exploitable resources, makes it a resource to others.
Ability to partake in that resource, and to eventually
become material partners in it, rather than maltreated generators of it, cannot be determined on
the arbitrary basis of culture. As the world becomes
more cosmopolitan, and the injustices of Westerndominated global capitalism come into sharper
relief, it will only grow more difficult to use mythical
geographies to support protectionism and exclusion
on the feeble foundation of “cultural difference.”
Only a radical openness can create a future that is
more honest, just, and functional than the past.
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THE CRISIS IS FAMILIAR: you love an artist, spend years of
your life taking in his work and singing its praises,
nourishing your soul on his art. Then, one day, you
realize that he is not a good person—he did or said
something immoral, revolting, inexcusable. The
verdict is plastered in the headlines and smeared
across the Internet, impossible to ignore: your favorite artist is a scumbag. So you have to figure out
what to do. Can you keep listening to and admiring
his work? Or must you instead do as the newspapers and the newsfeeds demand and abandon ship,
shouting hurried disavowals of your past devotion
before you hit the water?

then he splinters Simone’s words and scatters them
throughout the track—the song’s first layer. Next he
adds an entirely unexpected second layer: a series
of verses describing a failing celebrity marriage, with
particular attention lavished on drug use and the
post-separation division of money. And as the song
kicks into high gear, West introduces a third layer: an
extraordinarily forceful and unsettling house-music
beat, which thumps underneath most of the song.

The first time I heard “Blood on the Leaves,” I was
bowled over by its raw power. But I was also perplexed: what was West’s intention? It seemed offensively mismatched to pair Simone’s evocation of
Like many other people, I faced this crisis in 2018. It lynching with lyrics about a millionaire’s marriage in
came via my devotion to the work of Kanye West. I
crisis. But this, I came to realize, was precisely the
discovered his music when I entered high school,
point. “Blood on the Leaves” is about the degradation
and it blew my world open. I had never heard anyof American pop-culture, the ways in which its moral
thing like it before: its propulsive energy, structural
center has rotted. West does not want Simone’s
rigor, and intellectual range taught me what great
sample and his verse to fit together—he wants them
music can be and how to listen to it. I would go
to clash, and for this contrast to upset us. How did
through cycles where I listened to nothing but a sin- America go from songs about lynching to songs
gle song, “Lost in the World” or “Blood on the Leaves” about alimony? There is a conversation happening in
every morning on my way to school. There was some- the song: Simone tries to remind the speaker (heard
thing about West’s music that seemed undeniable
in West’s verses) of the history he has forgotten, but
to me, the progression from word to word and sound he does not listen. He shouts her down, dominating
to sound inevitable in the way of all great poetry.
the track. All the while, that bludgeoning house-beat
As I walked down the street or stood in the subway
keeps churning, crushing history under its wheel.
listening, I felt the urge to thrust my headphones
into the hands of a stranger: listen to this! You have
Importantly, West knows that he is part of the corno idea of the world I’m living in right now, the world ruption and the forgetting, what with his wealth and
this music has given me.
his vanity. “Blood on the Leaves” is a blow directed
against itself and its creator—which is why West
What makes West’s music this good? Perhaps the best casts his own voice in the role of the self-obsessed
example is “Blood on the Leaves,” a six-minute tourspeaker who cannot seem to hear Simone’s cry
de-force from his 2013 album Yeezus. The backbone
from the past. The most pointed evidence of this
of the song is a sample from Nina Simone’s version
self-awareness comes in the song’s climax: a heavily
of “Strange Fruit,” a haunting song that describes the auto-tuned West implores himself to “breathe” and
lynching of black Americans. “Strange fruit hanging
“live,” even as Simone’s aching description of “black
from the poplar trees,” Simone intones. “Blood on the bodies swinging in the summer breeze” continues
leaves.” West begins the song with this sample, and
in the background. Breathe and live—the two things
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that a lynched person cannot do. The speaker’s lack
of self-awareness is galling, but West’s abundance
of self-awareness makes the song extraordinary. As
he put it years before on “All Falls Down,” “we all
self-conscious, I’m just the first to admit it.”

politics and completely focusing on being creative.”
But then, on the first day of 2019, West came circling
back: “Trump all day,” he tweeted. “Just so in 2019 you
know where I stand.” The Kanye show was back on
the air.

West accomplishes all of this not through didactic
explanation, but instead via the counterpoint of
samples and words, borrowed sounds and fragmented melodies. This is the centerpiece of West’s
brilliance: his ability to play various facets of his
music against each other, to create nuance and argument through musical tension. West’s best songs are
in conversation with themselves, as each facet of the
music makes its case and their curator assembles
them into a sonic whole. The participants that West
draws into this conversation are astonishing in their
variety, demonstrative of his encyclopedic command
of music history—his samples range from 1960’s
Hungarian rock to contemporary hip-hop, touching
on countless traditions in between. Many artists can
write a great verse, and many can produce a great
track; but Kanye West is one of very few who has the
audacity, the knowledge, and the skill to make music
that is somehow both at odds with itself and entirely
sure of its purpose.

When the headlines about West’s comments at TMZ
first flashed across my phone last spring, I reacted
with bemusement rather than anger. What he had
said was jaw-dropping, to be sure, but it seemed
more like a particularly ugly sideshow than an
event of real political importance. I rolled my eyes,
watched a few highlights from the TMZ video, and
went back to my day. I had been listening to some of
my favorite West songs all week, and his new comments weren’t about to stop me. The song I had on
repeat that day was “Runaway.” “You’ve been putting
up with my shit just way too long,” West rapped into
my headphones. I smiled.

But as West continued to assert his views, I began to
realize that his alt-right outburst merited an angrier
response than I had given. I finally got around to
watching the TMZ video in its entirety, and I was
struck by the response of Van Lathan, the black
TMZ employee who became momentarily famous
for shouting back at West from across the office
***
floor. Lathan told West that there would be “realworld, real-life consequence” for what he was saying,
I always knew that West was, to put it mildly, not very and accused him of ignoring how the President he
agreeable. His arrogance was the stuff of celebrity
was embracing was a threat to the lives of black
legend. But it never seemed consequential—that was Americans who don’t live in West’s celebrity bubble.
gossip, and I was in it for the music. Then came 2018, What struck me was the intensity of Lathan’s feeling.
and the situation changed. In April, West emerged
For Lathan, West was not merely another celebrity
from a long public absence with a flurry of tweets
gone off the rails; he was a powerful man doing
boasting of his support for President Trump. The
harm to the very community that had made him a
photos of West sporting a “Make America Great
star. Lathan, in his own words, was “unbelievably
Again” hat lapped up most of the media attention,
hurt.”
but they were hardly the only alarming statement
he made. For instance, he also tweeted “I love the
The magnitude of West’s betrayal fully hit me when
way Candace Owens thinks,” giving a thumbs-up
I read Ta-Nehisi Coates’ blistering essay “I’m Not
to the Fox News commentator who claimed that
Black, I’m Kanye” the following week. Coates’ piece
Black Lives Matter protesters are “a bunch of whiny was not solely concerned with West—it was about
toddlers, pretending to be oppressed for attention.”
the intersections of celebrity, race, and heritage. But
West’s support for Trump was not an isolated media what stayed with me was his searing condemnation
stunt: he had embraced and chosen to broadcast the of West’s immorality: “West’s ignorance is not merely
views of the alt-right.
deep, but also dangerous.” He said that West had
“chosen collaboration.” He accused West of “lending
Things got worse a week later with West’s infamous
his imprimatur, as well as his Twitter platform of
visit to the headquarters of the celebrity gossip pub- some 28 million people [now more than 29], to the
lication TMZ. Accompanied and supported by Owens, racist rhetoric of the conservative movement.” He
West rattled off a string of appalling statements, and argued that West had become “a mouthpiece” for
justified them in the name of “free thought.” Once
America’s most horrific instincts.1 He was right.
again, a singularly galling sound-bite sucked up the
As the gravity of West’s remarks sank in, I could have
media coverage of West’s appearance: his claim
that “slavery for 400 years…sounds like a choice.” But abandoned it all, wiped the slate clean and said what
so many others were saying at that time: I’m done
as with his Twitter rant, there were plenty of other
with Kanye West. Instead, I found myself going back
claims that largely escaped the public’s attention.
He enthusiastically repeated Fox News’ racist ‘black- to all of my old West favorites in order to explore my
conflicted reaction to his public offenses. Would I
on-black crime’ talking point. He lauded Trump for
allowing business owners to bypass regulations and still love his art as much as I had? Would I feel guilt
increase their profits. Perhaps most upsetting of all, or regret about that love? Would the image of West
in his MAGA hat prompt me to reevaluate his past
he proudly embraced ignorance: “we can talk about
history, but not too long.” Like the speaker in “Blood work? It did not; I loved his albums as much as I ever
had. Still, the conflict between my admiration for
on the Leaves,” West bullishly shouted down the
lessons of the past. It was a deplorable show of bad West’s music and my disdain for his recent remarks
did not sit well with me. I began constructing a simpolitics and bad morals.
ple story, one designed as much to exculpate me, the
listener, as to describe reality: Kanye West was a
West’s garish behavior continued for months, culbrilliant artist who could not handle fame, stumbled
minating in a visit to the White House in October.
into the arms of an evil political movement, and lost
Sitting across from Trump, West gave a ten-minute,
his former genius. If this turned out to be the case—if
seemingly unprepared speech. There were bits of
West had been a great artist, but no longer was—then
real content sprinkled in—like West’s insightful, if
perhaps I didn’t need to reckon with the fact that I
bizarrely expressed, take on the 13th Amendment—
delighted in the art of a Trump supporter.
but they were drowned in a sea of spurious nonsense. The President looked thrilled. And then, at
Then a burst of new music arrived, fresh on the
the end of October, it all seemed to stop. Following
heels of all the controversy, and my simple story
an apparently minor scuffle with his then-friend
fell apart. I thought the new albums were terrific.
Owens (the two subsequently parted ways), West
West released five albums in May and June. Three
announced on Twitter: “my eyes are now wide open
of them were works he produced for other artists.
and now realize [sic] I’ve been used to spread messages I don’t believe in. I am distancing myself from The other two were a solo album entitled ye and a

collaboration with Kid Cudi entitled Kids See Ghosts.
Two of the three West-produced albums (Pusha T’s
Daytona and Teyana Taylor’s K.T.S.E) were excellent:
tightly constructed, brilliantly produced (West’s hallmark), mischievously dirty, and a lot of fun. But the
core of West’s project lay in ye and Kids See Ghosts,
and these were the albums to which I found myself
returning over and over again in the subsequent
months, drawn in by an orbit of unexpected potency.

Kanye West has placed those who admire his work in
a confounding predicament. His public persona over
the past six months has been immoral. The content
of ye and Kids See Ghosts, while far more nuanced
than West’s public statements, is not unimpeachably
ethical: both albums feature sexist lyrics as well as
moments in which West defends or minimizes his
recent behavior. And yet I think these albums are
extraordinary. What happens now?

ye and Kids See Ghosts are powerful because they
spring from a spirit of reckless, instinctual, firstthought-best-thought creative force: “just say it out
loud, just to see how it feels,” as West says on the
first track of ye. The result is that they shift form
constantly, sometimes even mid-song. In the case
of ye, this shape-shifting is evident from the first
track, “I Thought About Killing You”: it begins as a
dark, meditative spoken-word monologue, only to
transform midway through into a dance track with a
powerful trap beat. The album is full of such jarring
pivots—stylistically, structurally, and in content.
“Yikes” and “All Mine” are energized chunks of braggadocio in which West boasts about his invincibility
and sexual prowess; “Wouldn’t Leave” and “Violent
Crimes” are soulful, almost repentant songs in which
West criticizes himself for his irresponsible behavior
and his objectification of women, even as he sporadically continues to objectify them. The album does
not bother to choose between its many seemingly
contradictory identities—it swerves between them
at breakneck speed, daring you to come along for
the ride. Kids See Ghosts is equally impossible to
pin down, oscillating between jittery, nerve-jangling
energy and warm, contemplative self-reflection.

***

The music is a mess, full of intellectual inconsistencies and unpolished lyrics. And it is precisely this
disarray that is the source of its impact and profundity. West’s work has always fused vast musical
knowledge with sheer artistic instinct, and never
before has he so fully allowed his impulses to take
over, spilling his influences and contradictions
and half-made soundscapes onto the tracks. This
is a different artistic mode than that of “Blood on
the Leaves.” What distinguished that song was its
thoughtfulness and intentionality. West had a plan,
and he executed it. Not a lot on ye and Kids See
Ghosts feels planned. This is West’s new project: he
wants to strike by ambush, creating work before he
even knows what he wants to say. It’s not that the
music is vacuous, but rather that West has chosen
a different route to reach his insights. He wants to
stumble upon them, surprising himself as much as
us, and he trusts that his instincts will lead him to
something worthwhile.

The cleanest answer is obvious: boycott Kanye West.
For some, the impulse to do so is rooted in a visceral
reaction—the same hurt that Lathan described,
mixed with sheer disgust. This is understandable.
But others, either implicitly or explicitly, use logical
arguments to justify a boycott. The most sophisticated of these rationalizations is what we could call
the argument from economic dissent, and it takes
the following form. It is a shame, the boycotter says,
to abandon the music of Kanye West. But we cannot
stand idly by as a powerful public figure advances
ideas that sanction the oppression of our fellow citizens. We must make it known that these ideas are
unacceptable. And for the vast majority of us, the
only communication we have with West is through
the music he sells. Unfortunate as it is, we must
therefore show our disapproval by refusing to buy.
This is a powerful argument. It is true that the most
efficacious way to voice displeasure with West is to
stop buying and streaming his albums. The alternatives—an angry Facebook post, a sharply worded
letter, a comment amongst friends—seem pathetically ineffectual. And we should certainly want to
send a message to West that his support of racist rhetoric and policies is unacceptable. West’s
platform is huge: more than 29 million followers on
Twitter alone. His actions, in combination with his
power, demand pushback. And yet I think that this
argument for a boycott should not be accepted, for
it fails to recognize (or else gravely underestimates)
the damaging precedent that a boycott would set.

To grasp this danger, we must understand the premises on which the argument from economic dissent
rests. By arguing that we should abandon West’s
music to show dissent for his public statements, the
boycotter fuses (however reluctantly) the man with
the music, the artist with the art. Listening to West’s
music, per this logic, is an endorsement of his brand,
and thereby of him in his entirety: music, public
statements, private behavior, all of it. The problem with this is that it treats artists like politicians,
viewing each as an inseparable entity deserving of
either support or opposition. We hold—or at least
In and of itself, instinctual randomness does not
should hold—our politicians to specific standards.
make for a great album—the work must still be more They ought to check their facts, avoid contradicting
than the sum of its parts. Thrillingly, improbably, ye
themselves, and be wary of the repercussions of
and Kids See Ghosts add up to something profound. their public statements and actions. We look to them
West makes us feel the pit at the center of being
for moral public positions. If they do not meet these
human, the deep chasm where loss, sorrow, desperstandards, they do not deserve our support. And
ation, and the knowledge of mortality reside. He
because our option is binary (vote for or against), a
never directly references the pit, but instead evokes politician who does not deserve our support neceverything that surrounds it, all the bluster, numbessarily deserves our opposition. But to approach
ness, and giddy energy that are on the periphery of
artists in the same way is an error. If we treat artists
that terrible center. West shows us the shadows, not like politicians, then we will come to believe that
the thing itself. He doesn’t have to: we can feel how
our perspective on them should hinge on their conclose it is. He is able to do this because he possistency and their morality, that we should give a
sesses the inexplicable instincts of a great poet, the thumbs up to the artist who voices good politics on a
ability to pluck the right phrase or sound as if from
late-night talk show and a thumbs down to the artist
thin air. Take, for example, the most memorable line who says something morally “problematic” (to use
on ye, which is delivered by guest artist 070 Shake.
that vaguest and cheapest of contemporary critiNear the end of “Ghost Town,” she howls: “I put my
cal terms). We will listen to the albums of the artist
hand on a stove to see if I still bleed.” In an interwhom we endorse as a person and disregard the
view upon the album’s release, Shake told a revealing albums of the artist whom we condemn as a person.
story about the line’s creation: “it’s funny because
This will happen quite irrespective of other factors
my actual lyric was, ‘To see if I still feel.’ And then
that determine the quality of artistic work, like techYe [West] was like, ‘I want you to say bleed.’” West
nique, emotional impact, or insight.
does not need to explain his revision—when you hear
Shake deliver the line, the words are simply right.
Whence do we get the notion that listening to an
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album is the same as endorsing all aspects of the
artist, equivalent to voting for a candidate? The root
of the idea is simple: in America, we vote with our
wallets. When we choose to buy a certain product
rather than its competition, we say yea to the former
and nay to the latter. Then the companies making
those products look at how much they sold and
decide how they should change to get more purchases—more ‘votes,’ in other words. Buying music,
the reasoning goes, is no different; when we listen
to an album on Spotify, we tell the maker of the
album that we support him, and that he should keep
doing what he has been doing to earn our continued
patronage. So listening to West’s music does not
merely convey curiosity about the work of an artist—
it gives a vote to the man and all he says and does.
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to take art seriously. Neither option is ideal, and yet
we must choose—there is no middle ground. It is not
desirable to give Kanye West a free pass for what he
has said; it is immoral. But setting a precedent that
denies the value of art, that treats it as just another
product, strips society of an indispensable source
of value. To protect this core, we must be willing to
become morally flawed. An imperfect solution is the
best one I can find and the only one I can accept:
uneasy but unwavering, I will continue to listen.

There is a second rationale for boycotting West’s
music: the argument from hindsight. This argument
posits that West’s recent statements have tainted
his past artistic output, or at least brought out its
worst aspects. The components of West’s music that
were always present—the misogyny, bullish narcisWhen this argument is applied to strictly commersism, and muddled racial politics—now no longer
cial products, it is logical and productive. Papa John’s appear incidental. In light of his recent statements,
and Pizza Hut both mass produce pizza, but only
they seem to be part of a consistent project runthe former has an ex-CEO who was caught making
ning through West’s oeuvre, a project which led to
racist comments. If I were a regular customer of
Trumpism. Coates alluded to this argument in his
Papa John’s, it would make sense for me to transpiece on West, claiming that “one is forced to confer my business to Pizza Hut. It’s just a substitution
clude that an ethos of ‘light-skinned girls and some
of one second-rate pizza for another; why not use
Kelly Rowlands,’ of ‘mutts’ and ‘thirty white bitches,’
my dollars to make a statement? But applying the
deserved more scrutiny.” Indeed, Coates wondered
argument to art is different. Unlike Papa John’s pizza, whether such elements of West’s music were in fact
whose sole purpose is to create a product that will
“evidence of an emerging theme.”2 If they were, then
perhaps it is a legitimate act of artistic reinterpreattract buyers, art (when it is good) is made for reatation to now abandon West’s music, both past and
sons other than pulling in the maximum number of
customers. To use the logic of commercial mass-pro- present; why give our time to a project that was inexorably bending to the right, to slavery-as-a-choice, to
duction for art is an embrace of capitalism in its
racism?
crassest form—which is why it is disappointing to
see so much of the left adopt this argument.
The argument from hindsight is powerful because it
rests on musical interpretation rather than ecoIt is not entirely our fault: we have been raised on
nomic justifications—it has no need of the pizza
Marvel Studios and Taylor Swift, Fast and Furious
and Ed Sheeran. Like most Americans, I enjoy some model. And yet it shares a central premise with the
argument from economic dissent: that an artist’s
of these products and don’t enjoy others. But they
are all just that: products, like Papa John’s and Pizza work is one indivisible whole, and therefore can be
treated as a coherent political project from beginHut. Encouraged by movie studios and record comning to end. This is a tempting approach, allowing
panies, Americans have become accustomed to the
one to cherry-pick those pieces of an artist’s work
idea that works of art are merely another type of
that fall in line with his current statements. But it
product that we buy at the mall. Browse well, then
is simplistic: most worthwhile artists do not have a
pick your favorite brand. But serious artists are not
brands. They do not offer us near-identical products single argument running through their work. Instead,
at comparable costs. Each piece of art is a singular- their oeuvres are rich with contradictions—and this
is certainly the case with Kanye West.
ity: just because two artists make work in the same
medium and genre, we cannot conclude that they
are interchangeable, nor that we should vote for one For while it is easy to pluck morsels of Trumpism
from his lyrics, it is equally easy to find ideas that
at the expense of another.
contradict West’s current statements. Take the lyric
Coates referenced about “thirty white bitches.” The
To stop listening to West and compensate by doufull lyric (from his 2010 song “So Appalled”) is “chambling my consumption of Jay-Z—or even to be more
pagne wishes, thirty white bitches / I mean this shit
proactive and transfer my listening-dollars to an
up-and-coming rapper with admirable politics—is to is fucking ridiculous.” Is this a crass glorification
of excess, a self-lacerating critique of the speakfollow the pizza model. It implicitly posits that the
er’s crassness, or both? As is frequently the case in
primary purpose of West’s art was to fulfill a quota
West’s music, it is hard to tell. Contradictions and
in my musical diet, to satisfy a craving that could
the tensions they yield are precisely what makes
just as well be sated elsewhere. Admittedly, West’s
particular affinity for corporate branding makes my West’s work remarkable; to gloss over them in search
of a single political project would be a mistake. Nor
defense of art as a non-commercial enterprise look
a little silly. This is a man who has his own multi-mil- is West unaware of his role as a curator of inconsistencies. One of the most memorable lines from ye
lion-dollar sneaker line and has mastered the game
of promoting his persona as a brand; as Jay-Z might comes during “Violent Crimes,” when West interrupts his own monologue about the misogyny that
put it, West is not a businessman, he’s a business,
his daughter might face from violent men to take
man. Is it not naïve to say that his output should be
an unforgiving look in the mirror: “how you the devil
exempted from the capitalist game? Perhaps—but
West’s work is a risky and distinctive act of creative rebukin’ the sin?”
expression. For all the money and branding that
surrounds it, the music is art. To say that such work There is something important at stake here: the
question of who gets the final say in interpreting an
is just another product would mean that talking
artist’s work. West’s current statements do his music
seriously about art is utterly inane, like spending
hours debating the merits of Papa John’s pizza. This no favors. He is, intentionally or not, encouraging
is the consequence of the argument from economic listeners to focus on the most immoral aspects of
his art. But to follow his lead and thereby conclude
dissent: it establishes a model whereby art is just
that we were mistaken to hear anything other than
one more thing coming off the endless corporate
racism, misogyny, and denial of history in his work
assembly line.
necessarily posits that the artist is the best interWe are thus caught between a rock and a hard place: preter of his own work. This is not the case. It is perfectly possible for an artist to reach insights in his
either keep listening and lose an opportunity to
work that he did not intend, or else to retroactively
meaningfully dissent, or boycott and lose the right

misinterpret his own creation. So when I hear West
claim that “we can talk about history, but not too
long,” I see no need to revise my reading of “Blood
on the Leaves” as a song that critiques historical
forgetting. That interpretation did not rely on West’s
affirmation—it relied only on the music. Denying the
artist interpretive authority affirms the mysterious
potential of art: that it can say something even its
maker does not know.
The twin notions that an artist’s body of work is
indivisible and that his interpretation is correct also
produce a third justification for boycotting, one that
is particularly pervasive and particularly flawed: the
argument from purity. This argument posits that
letting the words of Kanye West enter one’s head
makes the listener less moral. The unethical components of the music, in tandem with the recent statements of its maker, corrupt the listener’s mind. This
argument rests, like the argument from hindsight, on
the notion that West’s entire body of work has a single definition, one largely determined by his current
statements. If we imbibe the music, we only internalize the bad bits. The argument from purity thus falls
on the same flaw as the argument from hindsight.

of failure, is an essential skill. It allows us to holistically appreciate works rather than being blinded by
a single shortcoming. Kanye West’s music stretching
all the way back to The College Dropout is not perfectly moral. It has moments of shortcoming, some
of them disturbing; these are worth discussing. But I
still love the music, and I still will return to it, again
and again.
***
One question remains, the most important one of
all: why is art worth it? It is easy to forget how to
respond to this. Moment by moment, day by day, it
seems like the world is falling apart. In comparison to such terrible threats, doesn’t the venerated
space in which artists experiment out loud look
less important? No thinking person can avoid this
creeping doubt, nor the thought that follows: maybe
there’s just no room in our world today for anything
but politics, for the clean, sharp, stubborn lines of
resistance. Why should we invest so much time and
energy defending the reckless ambiguities of art?
If there is a chance that listening to Kanye West
makes one less moral, or makes the world less good,
why is it worth the risk?

But it takes a further logical misstep: if we choose
not to imbibe the music of artists like Kanye West,
There is no one answer. Art gives us many things,
it suggests, then perhaps we can avoid immorality.
and what it gives shifts depending on the needs
Perhaps we can be pure. While this desire is underof the society and the listener. Most obviously, it
standable, it is impossible: part of being human is
gives us insight: “Blood on the Leaves,” for examhaving immoral thoughts and figuring out what to do ple, changed how I saw America. Equally evident is
with them. One cannot succeed in ridding oneself of that art can offer pleasure, something that is often
such thoughts by refusing to take in morally-questrivialized but is an essential part of a good life and
tionable art. We should want to be good people—but a good society. As that most poetic of American
that means doing the hard work of grappling with
socialist slogans asserts, we do not only need bread—
immoral thoughts, not refusing to engage with them. we need roses too. Recently I found myself listening
To mute morally questionable content is thus more
to West’s song “Father Stretch My Hands, Pt. 1” in a
about appearing moral than actually being moral. If nearly-deserted subway car while returning home
we make our minds into sacred cities, guarded at all late at night. When the beat dropped, it was so
times to ensure that nothing other than agreeable
graceful, so decisive, so supple, that I let out a giddy
and morally sound ideas (or ideas stated by agreelaugh. I could not contain myself: the sheer pleaable and morally scrupulous people) get in, we do
sure that the music had brought me needed to be
so with little benefit and at great cost: we starve
expressed. It was soul-enlivening.
ourselves of ideas.
And art also heals. Few would think of West’s music
Suppose that we accept my arguments against boyas soothing, and yet a strain of gentle humanism
cotting West’s music. Now we must pose a slightly
runs through his entire body of work. From “Family
different question: is it okay to like that music?
Business” (2004) to “Ultralight Beam” (2016) to “Cudi
Those who would answer in the negative assert that
Montage” (2018), West has made songs that are
West’s music has immoral components (even when
hymns to community, prayers for deliverance, beneconsidered separately from his public persona), so
dictions for continued life. Like so much else in his
to like it is immoral. This fails to recognize that
music, the healing power of these songs stems from
morality is not a binary, but a sliding scale. Some
West’s mastery of contrast—frequently such songs
works of art (most of them boring) are scrupulous
are situated on albums directly before or after harsh,
and pure in their morality. Some works are horrific
feverishly energetic tracks. This positioning accenand evil in their morality (or lack thereof). But the
tuates the music’s healing power, making it feel
interesting work exists somewhere in the middle. So necessary and earned. West’s music offers not the
while it would indeed be immoral to feel fondness
cheap and short-lived salve of comfort, but the deep
for The Birth of a Nation or Triumph of the Will, the
satisfaction of empathy. It does not solve our probmorality of liking things that lie somewhere in the
lems, but it reminds us that we are not alone, and
grey zone—that are immoral here and there, but not
that someday, somehow, salvation might be possible.
to their core––is far more complicated.
But art can also offer something else, something
Our assessment of these works must therefore
more mysterious. That mystery something is best
incorporate the other scales in play—those meadefined by example. In June, someone published
suring technique, emotional impact, insight, and
a short video on YouTube, an excerpt from the lispleasure, to name a few. When a work ranks highly
tening party that West held in Wyoming to release
on all of these scales but has morally questionable
ye. The video, shakily filmed on a cell phone, drops
moments, it is not wrong to like that work. Morality
the viewer in during “Ghost Town.” On the outskirts
is one factor of many in the consideration of art. In
of the party, 070 Shake is dancing to the booming
the 1936 film Swing Time, for example, Fred Astaire
sound of her own outro: “and nothing hurts anyperforms a dance in blackface. The dance is not
more, I feel kind of freeeeee.” Shake is only 21 years
central to the plot, it is not a lengthy portion of the
old, and she still looks and carries herself like the
film—but it is there, and it is immoral. Does this
kid from small-town New Jersey that she is. She is
mean that we must dislike the whole film, that we
jubilant, and as the sound of the song rises she runs
should not express fondness for any of its other
off into the wide-open Wyoming field behind her,
aspects? Or what of The Beatles, who sang “I’d rather carving out a wide arc, returning to the crowd’s edge,
see you dead, little girl, than to be with another
then veering off again. As she runs, she extends her
man”—is all of Rubber Soul now irredeemable? No: to arms like a child imitating an airplane. A bright light
introduce nuance into our reactions, to say that we
throws her into sharp relief, illuminating a young
admire a piece of art while recognizing its moments artist’s joy for all to see. “We’re still the kids we used
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to beeeee.” Lil Yachty’s distinctive red braids bounce
into the frame. The whole time, a stocky white man
in a cowboy hat lurks in the background, not moving,
flanked by an equally stationary dog. “I put my hand
on a stooooove to see if I still bleeeeeed.”
It is an astonishing scene: strange, hilarious, inspiring, disturbing, intensely moving. Every time I watch
it, this little video embeds itself into my consciousness like a seed and then grows rapidly, pushing
outward until it is no longer a part of me but I am
a part of it, and then it keeps expanding until it is
not something but everything, the whole of what I
see, feel, and know. In one little minute, it captures
the mystery and sorrow and joy and tumult of being
alive. That is what art can give.
Kanye West may not be your artist of choice. You
may feel none of what I feel when you listen to his
music. But whichever artist shapes your world and
returns it to you as a gift, dynamic in its imperfection—do not trade that person’s contribution for a little more dissent and a false assurance of purity. Art
is not a product, nor a way to reaffirm the perfection
of our morals. It is the record of our collective time
here on earth. If we do not choose to value that, then
we may one day turn around to see that we’re living
in a society with no justification for art. Or, far more
terrifyingly, we may not turn around at all.
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1 Coates, Ta-Nehisi. "I'm Not Black, I'm Kanye." The Atlantic.
May 7, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/
archive/2018/05/im-not-black-im-kanye/559763/.
2 Ibid.
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